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Abstract:  The  Bank  of  Abyssinia,  established  in  1905,  was given  a 50-years  concession  by  the 
Emperor  Menelek  II.  This  institution  was  engaged  in  issuing  notes  as  well  as  in  any  kind  of 
commercial banking business. Haile Sellassie, after acceding to the throne in 1930, could not accept 
that the country’s issuing bank was a foreign-owned share company and decided for nationalization. 
The  change  was  implemented,  however,  in  a  soft  way,  providing  an  adequate  compensation  to 
shareholders, and in agreement with the main foreign shareholder, the National Bank of Egypt. The 
Bank of Abyssinia went, therefore, into liquidation and a new institution, the Bank of Ethiopia, was 
established in 1931. The new bank, although under full Government control, retained management, 
staff, premises and clients of the ceased financial institution. Italian occupation of the country, in 
1936, brought the liquidation of the Bank of Ethiopia. 
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1. Introduction 
Most of the contemporary qualified economic literature emphasizes the relevance 
of financial innovations, embodied both in financial institutions and in financial 
technologies, in promoting and speeding up economic development. Basic changes 
and convenient arrangements conducive to economic development were brought up 
in Ethiopia also in the financial  sector during the first decades of XX century. 
Ethiopian banking history, in fact, goes as far back as 1905, when the first bank, 
the Bank of Abyssinia was established in the country. The second relevant event 
was  the  nationalisation  of  issuing  banking  decided  by  Haile  Sellassie  with  the 
establishment of the Bank of Ethiopia. The third event was Italian colonization in 
1936,  when,  following  liquidation  of  the  Bank  of  Ethiopia,  a  broad  banking 
network, extended to encompass all Italian possessions in the Horn of Africa and 
closely linked with the metropolitan financial system, was set up. ŒCONOMICA 
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The paper concentrates on the period of the banking history of Ethiopia (1930–
1936), marked by significant changes in the institutional features of this industry in 
the country. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a 
necessary background by summarizing the main phases for the implementation of 
the Bank of Abyssinia’s project. Section 3 deals with the first step adopted in the 
path for the crucial institutional financial innovation: the liquidation of the previous 
bank. Section 4 reports on the establishment of the Bank of Ethiopia and evaluates 
the results achieved by this institution during its short life. Section 5 concludes 
with the liquidation of this bank enforced by Italian authorities in 1936.  
 
2. The project for an Ethiopian bank implemented by Menelek II 
Emperor Menelek II wanted to establish a bank in the country, at that time called 
Abyssinia (Sellassié, 1932). For understandable motives of national pride he gave 
preference to a financial institution at least formally independent rather than to a 
much easier solution represented by opening a branch office of an expatriate bank. 
The Emperor contacted envoys from a number of European countries asking all of 
them for assistance in carrying out the project for a bank (Caselli & Mauri, 1986). 
While political and financial aspects of the project were being discussed in some 
European continental countries, the prompt British answer reached Addis Ababa. 
London  was  ready to provide  assistance  in  this venture and  felt it  was  best to 
entrust the task to the National Bank of Egypt, a private bank, under British control 
registered in Egypt as a limited company (Mauri, 1997).  
 An agreement was reached and, on March 11
th, a convention for establishing the 
bank was signed in Addis Ababa by the two parties: the Emperor of Ethiopia and 
the National Bank of Egypt.
1 The new bank was established in Cairo as a joint-
stock company according to the Egyptian commercial law at the end of May 1905. 
The  statute  was  drawn  up  bearing  in  mind  all  the  clauses  contained  in  the 
Convention of Addis Ababa. The share capital of Bank of Abyssinia was set at 
pound sterling 500,000, divided into 5-pound shares. Of this authorized capital a 25 
per cent was to be paid-in at the time of the constitution. Cairo was chosen for the 
registered  office  of  the  institution  and  consequently  as  the  forum  for  Board  of 
Directors' and Shareholders' meetings.  
The statute called for the adoption of the pound sterling as the unit of account of 
the Bank of Abyssinia, even though most bank transactions would be carried out, 
as  usual  in  Ethiopia,  in  Maria  Theresa's  thalers.  This  feature  was  not  to  have 
unimportant consequences for the Bank management, since the money of account 
                                                            
1 The convention, known as “Charter for the Bank of Abyssinia”, drawn in a twin-language text 
(English and Amharic), had provisions which covered the main features to be conferred to the Bank 
and listed some privileges guaranteed  to this institution by the Ethiopian government for 50 years 
(Mauri, 1967). ŒCONOMICA 
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was on gold standard, while the specie normally used for payments in Ethiopia was 
based on silver standard. The Governor of National Bank of Egypt was to be the 
Board's ex-officio Chairman; he was to be a voting member as were the Governor 
of  Bank  of  Abyssinia  (Vice  Chairman  of  the  Board)  and  an  additional  eight 
ordinary members. The latter were to be nominated by the Shareholders' meeting; 
at least three of them were to be chosen among Board members of the Egyptian 
bank and two among Ethiopian notables.
1  
The 100,000 shares of Bank of Abyssinia were assigned as follows: 50,000 shares 
to an Anglo-Egyptian Group, 25,000 shares each to an Italian Group and a French 
Group.  However  all  the  shares  were  to  be  placed  in  a  common  account 
administered by National Bank of Egypt, which had pledged to take up 29,000 
shares for itself  and for the eight  directors;  parallel  pledges were made  by  the 
French and Italian groups for 13,000 shares each. In order to offer the remaining 
45,000 shares for public subscription, a banking syndicate, located in Paris at the 
headquarters  of  the  Société  Générale  de  Credit  Industriel  et  Commercial,  was 
formed, in which British banking group held 50 per cent and French and Italian 
groups 25 per cent each. Placing of Bank of Abyssinia shares, as expected, had a 
considerable success. In fact, 610,000 shares, i.e. more than thirteen times the total 
amount offered, were subscribed (Mauri, 1997).  
The opening ceremony for the Addis Ababa head office of Bank of Abyssinia was 
held on February 15th, 1906 in the presence of the Emperor and his retinue of court 
dignitaries  and  diplomatic  envoys  (Pollera,  1926).  From  the  beginning  of  its 
activity Bank of Abyssinia made conscious efforts to build up its administrative 
organization and lay out a network of branches in the country.  
The management of Bank of Abyssinia from the very start of the Bank's operations 
continued Menelek's cause of spreading the use of national currency throughout the 
country.
2 Efforts were made to establish confidence on the exchangeability of the 
notes issued by the Bank and to familiarize the public with its services (Duggar, 
1967). The widening of the monetary area of the Ethiopian economy was a chief 
objective strongly pursued, although with differing ends, both by the Government 
and the Bank of Abyssinia: the former aimed at the country's progress, the latter at 
gaining the confidence of the public for the expansion of its notes. It could be 
thought that the Bank could have full control of the money supply in Ethiopia, 
given that it minted coins for the State, issued notes under monopoly and was the 
only depository institution in the country. In truth the Bank's powers were greatly 
                                                            
1 Thanks to the casting vote of the Board Chairman, the control over the bank was guaranteed to the 
British  even  in  the  unlikely  event  of a coalition  among  all  other Board  members,  European and 
Ethiopian. (Mauri. 1967). According to Schaefer (1992) “from 1906 to 1909 the bank acted as a tool 
of British imperialism”. 
2 Lowering interest rates was also one of the targets pursued by Menelek II in contemplating the 
establishment of a bank in the country (Schaefer, 1992). ŒCONOMICA 
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limited, since national specie and bank notes had a very narrow circulation, which 
did not reach, in most instances, beyond the major urban centres. At the same time, 
the  Maria  Theresa  silver  thaler,  a  full  value  commodity  money,  was  in  use 
everywhere not only in Ethiopia but also in the countries of the Red Sea Littoral 
(Tschoegl, 2001). Coming back to the issue of notes by Bank of Abyssinia, it has to 
be underlined that these notes had to be fully covered by silver coins. Last, no 
reserve  requirements  were  asked  on  deposits,  but  disappointedly  for  the  Bank, 
current accounts held only a marginal position among the kinds of money used for 
payments in the country. Bank notes and bank deposits, in fact, are to be regarded 
as interchangeable forms of bank liability for payments, but their use depends on 
public’s choices. 
Because  of  the  country's  backwardness,  which  made  transfer  of  money  quite 
difficult and expensive, large cash balances in specie were needed in branches. It is 
not therefore too surprising to find out that earning assets represented less than half 
of  the  Bank's  total  assets.  In  part  loans  and  investments  were  made  in  Egypt, 
primarily during the Bank's early years. The usual lending of Bank of Abyssinia in 
Egypt  was  made  by  advances  on  securities,  a  type  of  transaction  unknown  in 
Ethiopia, where guaranteed loans, overdraft facilities and advances on goods, often 
stored in warehouses, were granted. 
Since the first days of this venture a great part of bank credit was channelled to 
financing international trade. In particular, the Bank was involved on the one hand 
in financing the collection and export of the primary commodities, such as coffee 
and  on  the  other  in  financing  distribution  of  imports  of  consumer  goods. 
Investments in British Government bonds were also important, as a second line 
reserve. Deposit operations were not as successful as had been hoped. In particular, 
the inflow of savings deposits was scarce because of a number of factors such as 
the modest branch network, the low level of per capita income, the early stage of 
monetary  development  of  the  country  (very  low  monetisation  ratio  of  the 
economy), the lack of confidence on the part of the public and the unattractive 
interest rate offered to depositors. Current account deposits recorded better levels, 
since  they  were  used  by  foreign  businessmen  and  rich  Ethiopian  clients  more 
accustomed to banking services and to the use of drawing cheques. The Bank of 
Abyssinia drew in considerable proceeds from exchange operations and imported 
huge  quantities  of  Maria  Theresa  thalers,  which  were  placed  in  the  domestic 
market. Transfer of funds within the country was also a good source of revenue, 
but international transfers were even more profitable for the Bank. 
A  glance  at  Bank  of  Abyssinia  series  of  Profit  and  loss  statements  and  an 
investigation  of  performance  determinants  reveals  considerable  variability  of 
results  due both  to business  climate  changes (connected  chiefly  with Ethiopian 
exports) and fluctuations in the price of silver and, consequently, in the exchange 
rate Ethiopian thaler / pound sterling. Losses were recorded during the first years of ŒCONOMICA 
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operation, but starting from 1909, profits are recorded. However caution dissuaded 
directors from paying dividends until 1918 in order to recover preceding losses 
registered in the take-off stage and because of uncertainties during the war period. 
For two years after dividends to shareholders were paid until a three-year slump of 
the Ethiopian economy (1921-1923). Payment of dividends recommenced in 1924 
and continued without interruptions until 1930 (Mauri, 1967). At the end of 1930 
the total amount of notes in circulation was 1,740,000 thalers (evaluated £. 88,549 
12 s. 4.d in the Balance Sheet of Bank of Abyssinia) fully covered in the assets side 
by an equivalent amount of silver coins. Cash on hand in specie was almost £. 164 
thousand and overall deposits more than £. 250 thousand. 
 
3. The Liquidation of Bank of Abyssinia  
When  Zawditu,  whose  sole  qualification,  according  to  prominent  Ethiopian 
historians (Bahru Zewde, 1991), was her birth, as the daughter of Menelek II, was 
proclamed Empress, Tafari Makonnen was designated regent of the empire and 
heir to the throne. Ras Makonnen had an impressive lineage and an extraordinary 
talent. He was open to foreign culture and very ambitious: since the beginning it 
was clear his climb to the throne. This goal was attained only after the death of 
Empress  Zawditu, in 1930. The coronation of Ras  Tafari Makonnen, under the 
style  of  Haile  Sellassie,  brought,  once  again  after  Menelek  II,  an  outstanding 
personality to rule Ethiopia. 
Haile Sellassie continued Menelek's policy aiming at independence, modernization 
and progress of the country. He had once been a member of the Board of Directors 
of Bank of Abyssinia and, following this line, gave priority to the reform of the 
Ethiopian monetary and banking system. Managers of the Bank, in a context of an 
“anti-foreign” movement, were blamed by a public opinion grown around the court 
in  Addis  Ababa  (Schaefer,  1992)  to  have  preconceptions  about  the  conduct  of 
banking  business,  which  were  the  result  of  their  cultural  background.  These 
criticisms  were  not  unfounded,  but  it  should  be  underlined  that  these  foreign 
bankers  brought  in  banking  business  good  standards  of  integrity  and 
incorruptibility.  The  people’s  criticisms  did  not  influence,  nevertheless,  the 
Emperor’s  decisions  on  this  matter  and  the  managers  of  the  Bank  were  not 
dismissed. In conclusion we can state today the opinion that Bank of Abyssinia had 
been of undeniable utility to the Ethiopian economy, but in 30’s times and views 
had changed and the Emperor thought that it was no longer possible for Ethiopian 
government to accept the fact that the only issuing bank operating in the country 
was owned and controlled by foreigners. He wanted a purely Ethiopian institution 
(Konczacki, 1962). Without delay Haile Sellassie made his decision known to the 
National Bank of Egypt and, since the Egyptian bank was not particularly reluctant ŒCONOMICA 
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to  withdraw  from  Ethiopia,  provided  an  adequate  compensation,  negotiations 
began in Cairo for Bank of Abyssinia liquidation.  
The legitimate and long standing Ethiopian aspiration of creating a truly national 
bank of issue did not necessarily imply the liquidation of the existing Bank of 
Abyssinia. It would have been sufficient to cancel the Abyssinian bank's privileges 
of issuing currency, of banking monopoly and of exclusive right to act as fiscal 
agent  for  the  Government.  At  the  same  time,  a  new  financial  institution,  an 
Ethiopian state bank, could have been created. Nevertheless, both parties' interests 
laid in liquidating Bank of Abyssinia. On the one hand, National Bank of Egypt 
was not so much interested to continue doing business in the country under the less 
favourable conditions brought about by the change in the political setting and, on 
the other hand,  the  Ethiopian  Government  strongly wanted  to make  use  of  the 
existing organization (assets, liabilities, management, personnel and premises) of 
the Bank of Abyssinia in order to speed up implementation of the project for the 
establishment of a State bank. The solution of liquidation of the Bank of Abyssinia, 
in fact, would make possible to establish the new bank without delay.
1 Negotiations 
were concluded on April 16th, 1930 with an agreement calling for (Zervos, 1936): 
a) revocation of concession and privileges granted to the Bank of Abyssinia in the 
1905 convention; 
b) the winding up of the Egyptian joint-stock company "Bank of Abyssinia"; 
c) liquidation of Bank of Abyssinia through conveyance en bloc of its assets and its 
liabilities to the Ethiopian Government; 
d) payment by the Ethiopian Government of a sum of 40,000 pounds to Bank of 
Abyssinia shareholders as a compensation for terminating the concession nearly 25 
years before it was scheduled to end and for the Bank's goodwill.        
In  accordance  with  agreed  conditions,  the  Ethiopian  Government  paid  up  to 
shareholders a total of £ 203,807. 7 s. 6 d. in instalments until July 1931. This 
amount  was  calculated  by  summing  up  the  adjusted  book  value  of  Bank  of 
Abyssinia, the above mentioned compensation of 40,000 pounds for terminating in 
advance the concession and the interest (at a rate of 6% per annum) on the debt of 
the Ethiopian Government from the end of 1930 to July 16th, 1931, the day on 
which the last instalment was paid. An important agreement was signed with the 
Ethiopian authorities on July 13th, 1932 regarding the notes issued by Bank of 
Abyssinia.  The  liquidators  transferred  to  the  new  Ethiopian  bank  the  specie 
reserves  in  Maria  Theresa  silver  thalers,  which  covered  issues  of  notes  by  the 
Abyssinian  bank  depositing  them  in  a  specific  account  entitled  “Trustee  for 
Redemption of Bank of Abyssinia in voluntary liquidation notes”. The new bank 
agreed to provide the conversion service for these notes free of charge (possibly by 
                                                            
1 Three liquidators were appointed: Sir Bertrand Hornsby, governor of the National Bank of Egypt, 
J.C. Sidley from Cairo and C.S. Collier, governor of the Bank of Abyssinia. Later, on request of the 
Ethiopian government, Hornsby was replaced by Mr. Johan Crawford from Cairo (Schaefer, 1992).  ŒCONOMICA 
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means of replacement with its own notes) and to make, as a guarantee, a deposit in 
South Australia 5% bonds with an overall face value of 5,000 pounds with National 
Bank of Egypt in Cairo. The guarantee deposit was to be freed gradually as Bank 
of Abyssinia notes were redeemed by the new Ethiopian bank and destroyed under 
the control of the Egyptian consulate in Addis Ababa. 
 
4. The Bank of Ethiopia 
The new bank was chartered as Bank of Ethiopia by the Imperial Decree issued on 
August 29th, 1931 and this act represented the first banking law ever passed in the 
country  (Pellegrineschi,  1936).  A  regime  of  ex-ante  authorization  for  banking 
industry  was  established  and  this  provision  was  justified  by  attributing  the 
qualification of public interest to banking operations.  
The Bank of Ethiopia was set up as a joint-stock company, with an authorised 
capital of £ 750,000 divided into 30,000 shares of 25 pounds each. Private Citizens 
were supposed to become shareholders since two different needs had to be met. On 
the one hand, given the important functions assigned to the Bank of Ethiopia, the 
Government was to have full control over the Bank’s management. On the other 
hand  private  contribution  to  the  share  capital  could  have  made  Government 
contribution less burdensome. The two objectives were not irreconcilable and it 
was deemed that the best solution would be to differentiate shares into two classes. 
Class A shares, 18,000 in number, would have been meant for the Government, 
while  class  B  shares,  12,000  in  number,  would  have  been  placed  by  public 
subscription. The two above-mentioned classes would have enjoyed equal rights, 
the only relevant difference lying in the appointment of the Bank's directors. The 
holders of the two classes of shares would have met separately: holders of class A 
shares (i.e. Government) to appoint six members of the Board and holders of class 
B shares to appoint the remaining four members. This formula would have ensured 
the Government's control over the Bank even with a minority stake in the equity 
capital. At the time of constitution, only half of the share capital, however, was 
paid up. At the closing of subscriptions, a total of 18,877 shares of the 30,000 
offered had been subscribed. The results did not come up to expectations as the 
public showed no interest in the operation. In particular, the subscription failed to 
attract foreign capital that had greatly contributed to the success of the Bank of 
Abyssinia  stock  subscription.  The  Ethiopian  Government  held  18,003  shares, 
nearly 95.4 per cent of the company capital, and another 874 shares were in the 
hands of the public. The paid-up capital of Bank of Ethiopia turned out to be £ 
235,692  10  s.  0  d.  instead  of  the  expected  £  375,000.  The  sum  paid  by  the 
Government  included  the  purchase  price  paid  to  the  shareholders  of  Bank  of ŒCONOMICA 
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Abyssinia because of its contribution in kind by conferring the assets and liabilities 
of the liquidated bank.
1  
Bank of Ethiopia notes, according to the Imperial Decree, were to be fully covered 
by reserves including: minted and ingot gold, foreign currencies (provided they 
were payable in gold), bank bills and acceptances in gold currency, Ethiopian and 
foreign short-dated government bonds and other assets of a similar nature. The 
various assets backing notes were not however perfectly fungible and ceilings had 
been established for some types of reserve-assets. The Bank of Ethiopia was made 
the depository of public funds and was to provide other normal banking services, as 
fiscal agent, to the Government.  
The institution began operations in November 1931 retaining the Governor Mr. 
Collier  (a  Canadian  banker),  appointed  chief  executive,  and  taking  over 
management, staff and premises of the ceased Bank of Abyssinia (Deguefe, 1965). 
Since  only  the  name  of  the  institution  had  changed,  most  of  the  public  were 
unaware of the event, which nevertheless represented a very important step on the 
way  toward  the  county's  emancipation  (Pankhurst,  1963).  Bank  of  Ethiopia 
however came into being with a more favourable position than Bank of Abyssinia. 
Relations with Ethiopian authorities were in fact much smoother than they had 
been  for  the  former  bank  since  all  Bank  of  Ethiopia  Board  members  were 
appointed by the Government itself. The powers of the Board of Directors were 
wide-ranging, encompassing also the main aspects of monetary management in the 
country. The Board was entrusted with fixing borrowing and lending rates applied 
by the Bank. Bank notes coverage in specie was only partial and not full as for 
Bank of Abyssinia. Eventually Bank of Ethiopia  could have  been  considered  a 
central  bank,  since, besides  enjoying  the  sole right of note issue  and  acting  as 
financial agent of the Government, it was providing refinancing facilities to other 
financial intermediaries. The Bank of Ethiopia gained, since its establishment the 
full central banking status and may be placed, therefore, among the first indigenous 
central banks set up in the whole of Africa (Ahooja, 1965).  
The Bank of Ethiopia in its ability to pursue an independent monetary policy and a 
credit supply policy could foster the economic development of the country. The 
Bank  however  was  run  conservatively  on  the  one  hand  because  had  to  face  a 
number of constraints and on the other hand because the management, taken over 
from Bank of Abyssinia, preferred to keep on with the customary cautious policy 
of the previous bank. The pound sterling was maintained as unit of account even 
though in transactions with customers the use of Maria Theresa’s silver thalers 
prevailed by far. The branch network took over by the Bank of Abyssinia was 
extended  and  encompassed  the  transit  office  in  Djibouti  and  6  branch-offices: 
                                                            
1  According  to  Schaefer  (1992),  many  deposit  accounts  were  unclaimed  and  could  have  been 
distributed to the Bank of Abyssinia’s shareholders. However the Bank was involved in enquiring on 
depositors and their heirs.   ŒCONOMICA 
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Debre Tabor, Dessie, Dire Dawa, Gambela, Gore, Harar. Efforts to spread the use 
of national currency throughout the country were eventually unsuccessful, but it 
should be mentioned that the main causes, which prevented the achievement of this 
ambitious goal were external and out of control of the Bank. It was decided to 
replace the silver standard of Bank of Abyssinia (full coverage of notes circulation 
in  silver  coins)  with  a  gold  exchange  standard system, based on British  pound 
sterling, even though only silver coins were circulating in the country. Frequent 
and sharp fluctuations in the value of silver (high volatility of prices in the past 
experience) had suggested to abandon the silver standard and to adopt a monetary 
system  based  on  gold;  therefore  minted  silver  was  to  be  allowed  to  continue 
circulating, but only as token money. There was no circulation of minted gold and 
the new Ethiopian golden thaler was in fact to be only a virtual monetary unit.  
Just less than a month after the Imperial decree was promulgated, an international 
crisis of the gold standard occurred. Bank of Ethiopia had to adapt to the new 
situation while its notes were covered by minted silver (Maria Theresa thalers) and 
foreign currency. Maria Theresa thalers served to maintain internal convertibility 
and thus to permit continued contacts with a domestic economy dominated by the 
Austrian silver coins as well as the settlement of trade balance’s with a number of 
neighbouring  countries.  Conditioned  by  its  political  and  economic  international 
ties, Ethiopia sought to remain linked to British sterling even after this currency 
interrupted  convertibility  into  gold  on  September  21st,  1931.  The  dual  reserve 
system of Bank of Ethiopia, due to the desire to link simultaneously the Ethiopian 
monetary  unit  to  pound  sterling  and  to  silver,  while  silver  prices  underwent 
considerable fluctuations, was a cause of serious problems for the Bank. In facing 
these disturbances the Ethiopian bank tried to stabilize the silver thaler / pound 
sterling exchange rate. In other words efforts of Bank of Ethiopia were directed to 
neutralize effects on the domestic market of fluctuations of silver prices on the 
London market. This policy caused a growth of smuggling on the borders of the 
country,  mainly  during  periods  marked  by  maximum  divergence  between  the 
market price of silver and the Bank's official price (Bertone, 1936). The Bank of 
Ethiopia  made  efforts  to pursue  the  objective  of  increasing  the  use  of  national 
currency in the country and to enlarge its sphere of influence on the economy. 
Another objective of the Bank’s monetary policy was to avoid disturbances due to 
seasonal movements.  
Attempts were made in the first place to safeguard what little progress had been 
achieved  by  Bank  of  Abyssinia.  The  new  bank  notes  therefore  had  format, 
languages and appearance similar to that of the previous ones. Issue of notes, under 
the new legislation, began in May 1932 in the following denominations: 5, 10, 50, 
100 and 500 Eth. thalers. In June 1933 notes in 2 Eth. thalers denomination were 
also issued (Zervos, 1936). As the new notes were issued the Bank of Abyssinia 
old notes were withdrawn from circulation. At the end of 1933 nearly 94% of the ŒCONOMICA 
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outstanding circulation of Bank of Abyssinia notes had been redeemed. While the 
note  substitution  went  on  smoothly,  it  proved  much  harder  job  to  expand  the 
circulation  of  paper  money  to  other  segments  of  domestic  economy.  Curiously 
enough, in some instances Bank of Ethiopia notes seem to have been accepted only 
at discounted value (Farago, 1935). Table 1 shows the circulation of notes issued 
by Bank of Ethiopia, figures refer to the end of month. The table indicates that he 
overall circulation of Bank of Abyssinia notes had been surpassed in October 1932, 
but reveals a standstill the following year. The peak was reached in February 1935 
and from the following month began to shrink owing to impending war. The table 
enlightens  another  interesting  phenomenon  still  visible  in  Ethiopia  today:  the 
seasonal  fluctuations  of  money  supply  due  to  exports  which  usually  make  an 
inflow of foreign currency during the first quarter of the year, creating monetary 
base.  
Table 1. Outstanding Notes of Bank of Ethiopia  
End-of-Month Circulation (unit: Eth. thalers) 
Month  Year 
      1932   1933   1934   1935 
January    -   2,282,680   2,336,531   2, 989,977 
February    -   2,459,305   2,541,601   3,143,080 
March    -   2,519,270   2,530,424   2,374,173 
April    -   2,358,320   2,625,174   2,709,780 
May   123,905   2,148,920   2,708,029   2,401,797 
June   976,580   2,127,145   2,728,366   2,306,276 
July   1,287,395   2,108,520   2,800,274   2,439,442 
August   1,327,155   2,194,560   2,785,261   2,001,235 
September   1,616,425   2,155,630   2,859,505   1,925,300 
October   1,858,500   2,209,479   2,591,692   1,658,243 
November   1,839,305   2,288,418   2,791,465   1,741,746  
December   2,065,135   2,121,632   2,890,620   1,804,322  
Source: Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Reports 
In  order  to  evaluate  correctly  the  results  achieved  by  Bank  of  Ethiopia  in 
developing  bank  notes  circulation  in  the  country  it  is  necessary  to  take  into ŒCONOMICA 
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consideration the circulation of foreign-minted silver coins during the same period 
of time. At this point it should be added that monetary reform also involved token 
coins by  establishing  a  decimal  based  fractional currency  system  of  nickel  and 
bronze  coins,  fully  backed  by  Maria  Theresa  thalers  in  the  Bank's  vaults.  The 
official figures on the stock of money within the country, at that time, show slightly 
less than 6.4 million thalers, made up approximately as follows: bank notes 44 per 
cent, token coins 11 per cent, bank checking deposits 45 per cent. Alongside this 
official  money  supply  circulated  theoretically  a  mass  of  full  value  commodity 
money (i.e. Maria Theresa silver thalers) estimated at 40 - 50 million pieces.  
The Bank of Ethiopia co-existed with other financial institutions, each catering to 
the needs of different types of customers and with little overlap of functions. The 
Bank  was  engaged  in  collecting  deposits  in  domestic  currency  as  well  as  in  a 
number of foreign currencies. There were no provisions for reserve requirements in 
respect to this liability similarly as it were with the Bank of Abyssinia. Demand 
deposits, chiefly made up with public funds, were not interest bearing and savings 
deposits  accounted  for  one  fifth  of  total  deposits.  Savings  passbooks  earned  a 
modest rate, which did not reflect market conditions. This fact, together with a lack 
of  a  savings  promotion  campaigns,  explains  the  unsatisfactory  growth  rate  of 
deposit balances.  
Earning assets were limited by the need to keep high idle cash balances in branch 
offices. Investment portfolio held Ethiopian and foreign Government bonds and 
bills. In addition the above mentioned South Australia 5% bonds were deposited as 
security for notes redemption with National Bank of Egypt. In lending operations a 
very  important  role  had  discounting  of  international  and  national  bills  and 
promissory  notes.  Advances  on  securities  and  merchandise,  whose  term  almost 
never  exceeded  six  months,  were  also  granted.  Merchandise  was  stored  in  the 
Bank's  warehouses  while  precious  metals  were  held  in  the  Bank's  vaults.  An 
interest  rate  of  8  -10%  was  applied  to  these  transactions.  In  addition  Bank  of 
Ethiopia granted loans to Ethiopian individuals covered by personal guarantees. 
Mortgage loans developed at a very modest rate. In conclusion it is undeniable that 
lending by the Ethiopian bank during the first years of operations was excessively 
prudent and that this institution did not take full advantage of its leading position to 
implement  a  lending  policy  conducive  to  speeding  up  economic  development. 
However the judgement should not be too severe because of the short life of this 
institution. In fact the Italian invasion of Ethiopia interrupted the take off of this 
bank.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The Italian authorities, after the fall of Addis Ababa in their hands, on May 5th, 
1936,  initially  allowed  normal  activities  of  Bank  of  Ethiopia  to  be  continued ŒCONOMICA 
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because some time was needed to make decisions on the Bank's future. They were 
faced in fact with two alternatives equally viable, but each tied to different views 
on the target structure of the banking system of the Horn of Africa. On the one 
hand there was the opportunity of keeping the Bank alive, changing its ownership 
(class A registered shares being transferred from the Ethiopian Government to the 
Italian Government), name, management and, partially, staff. This line of action, 
which had been successfully followed dealing with Société Nationale d’Ethiopie, 
nonetheless entailed the adoption of an autonomous stance in the monetary and 
credit field which had not been taken in the past in the former colonies of Eritrea 
and  Somalia,  but  which  did  not  lack  prominent  supporters  among  Italian 
economists.  On  the  other  hand  the  view  calling  for  a  complete  integration  of 
Ethiopia as well as other Italian possessions in East Africa into the metropolitan 
monetary and banking system necessarily implied the liquidation of the Bank of 
Ethiopia. The second alternative, mainly based on political issues of the Fascist 
regime, finally prevailed.
1  
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